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Abstract
This paper examines the distinct nature of Newtonian inductivism and its
connection to methodological atomism. According to this interpretation, Newton’s
Rule III for the Study of Natural Philosophy is a criterion for isolating the primary
qualities of the atomic parts. The universal nature of such qualities also raises the
laws describing these qualities to the status of laws of nature.
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1 Introduction
Newton’s commitment to induction is articulated in his Rule 4 for the Study of
Natural Philosophy. According to Newton, induction is the method that
determines a proposition’s scientific status. As he famously argues in the General
Scholium, science should not include any hypothesis whatever its merit might be, if
it is not gathered from the phenomena by induction (Newton, 1999, p. 943).
Following various criticisms of induction, the most central one being David
Hume’s, many philosophers of science adopted an Hypothetico-Deductive (HD)
account of science or some anti-inductivist line of thinking. Philosophers such as
Hanson (1970), Popper (2003), and Stein (1970, 1990) argued that Newton’s
inductivism functioned more as a rhetorical device, intended to prop up the
credentials of Newton’s theory of gravity and defend it from the criticism. But his
actual science must have relied on hypotheses and conjectures.
Newtonian scholarship in the last few decades has done much to mitigate the
reinterpretation of Newton’s method along HD lines.1 The main thrust of this
1See Dorling (1973), Glymour and Stalker (1980), Belkind (2012), Harper (2012) and
Smith (2002a,b).
scholarship might be summarized as showing that Newton made extensive use of
Demonstrative Induction (DI). The notion of a DI argument dates back to
Aristotle. According to Aristotle, we can sometimes derive from a particular
phenomenon its cause. Aristotle’s example is the following:
All planets do not twinkle.
All non-twinkling bodies are near.
Therefore, all planets are near.
This argument is deductively valid. It takes an observational generalization, and
uses another universal claim to derive a further universal claim. Nevertheless, a DI
argument is still inductive in character, since it moves from an observed fact to an
unobserved fact, that is, from the effect to the cause. In Aristotle’s example, the
transition is from the observed fact that planets do not twinkle, to the unobserved
fact (during Aristotle’s time), that planets are near. How is it that a DI inference
is possible? In the case of Aristotle’s example, the DI inference is made possible by
the proposition “All non-twinkling bodies are near”. This proposition is true
because there is a causal connection between being near and non-twinkling. The
following claim describes a causal relation:
All bodies that are near do not twinkle.
This proposition supports a counterfactual “if a body were far, it would
twinkle”. And this counterfactual’s contrapositive is “if a body does not twinkle, it
is not far”. The transition from an observed fact to its cause presupposes that at
least one of the premises include a law of nature, a causal relation, or a proposition
derived from a causal relation.
Newton’s application of a DI form of reasoning is perhaps one of the most
sophisticated ones in the history of science. For example, in Book III of the
Principia, Newton utilizes Kepler’s Area Law (i.e., that the radius from the central
body to each satellite covers equal areas in equal amounts of time) and Kepler’s
Harmonic Rule (that the period of the planets’ orbits and the radius of the orbit is
related as T 2 ∝ R3) to deduce the nature of the gravitational force. Thus, Newton
uses a mathematical form of reasoning to derive the nature of the cause (i.e., the
gravitational force) from its observed effects (Kepler’s Laws). Newton
demonstrates that the Area Law implies that the gravitational force is centripetal.2
Two important premises in this derivation, other than Euclid’s postulates, are
Newton’s first and second laws of motion.
Newton’s proof is geometric; he compared the motion that is involved in the
Area Law to the motion that would have resulted had the body continued in its
rectilinear motion without any force applied. Given the necessary connection
between change of motion and direction and presence of the force, we can examine
the phenomenal law, i.e., Kepler’s Area Law, relative to counterfactual scenarios.
At the same time that he showed the correlation between the Area Law and the
centripetal nature of the force, Newton also showed that were the Area Law not
valid, the force would not have been centripetal. Thus the argument has the
function of revealing the cause (the centripetal nature of the force) via the presence
of the effect (The Area Law).
A similar type of DI argument was utilized by Newton to argue for the
inverse-square nature of the force of gravitation. Taking Kepler’s Harmonic Rule,
Newton showed the inverse-square nature of the force. Were the planets not to
observe the Harmonic Rule, the force would not have been inverse-square.
Emphasizing the role of DI arguments in Newton’s reasoning bolsters to some
extent Newton’s assertion that he used induction in his derivation. It was
2See Harper (1990, 2002, 2012) and Belkind (2012) for an account of these inferences.
important for Newton to show how phenomenal laws can be used to derive the
nature of the force that gives rise to these phenomenal laws. However, for a DI
argument to work, it needs to rely on a premise that is derived from a universally
valid proposition; i.e., a causal law or a law of nature. Thus, the main contention
that can be leveled against accounts that emphasize the role of DI arguments is
that they are a variant of the HD method.3 Without an account of how inductive
arguments can ground laws of nature or causal laws, we have no justification in
treating background assumptions in DI arguments as anything but hypotheses or
conjectures. It is the process of elevating empirical claims to causal laws that
provides the hinges on which the DI method turns.
To fully endorse Newton’s claim that he is an inductivist, one needs to find an
argument that shows how laws of nature can be derived from the phenomena.
There is one methodological rule that might explain how such a derivation is
possible, and that is Newton’s Rule III for the Study of Natural Philosophy:
Rule III The qualities of bodies that cannot be intended or remitted
[i.e., qualities that cannot be increased or diminished] and that which
belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken
as qualities of all bodies universally. (Newton, 1999, p. 795)
Rule III purports to articulate a criterion for determining which qualities can be
deemed universal. I.e., Newton is providing us a rule for determining those qualities
that are present in all material bodies. Presumably, once we are able to ascertain
those qualities as universal, the laws articulating the nature of such qualities would
acquire the status of laws of nature that are necessarily valid. For example, if
extension is to be determined as a universal quality, the laws determining the
nature of extended bodies and their geometric properties, i.e., Euclid’s Geometry,
3See Worrall (2000) for such a suggestion.
would therefore be determined as laws of nature governing all bodies.
Rule III has the potential of bolstering and supporting the DI method,
explaining how certain background assumptions assume the role of laws of nature.
However, Rule III has been notoriously difficult to interpret. We find a variety of
readings of Rule III in the literature, which can be summarized as follows:
1. Rule III expresses commitment to Baconian Induction.
According to this reading, Rule III argues that a property that observed in all
bodies can be universalized to all bodies whatsoever. So Rule III is simply an
inductive procedure applied on a massive scale. This reading is natural since
Newton asserts that qualities which belong to all bodies on which
experiments are made belong to all bodies universally. According to this
reading, Rule IV asserts the same methodological rule articulated in Rule III;
while Rule III consider the inductive inference itself, Rule IV also explains
that induction functions as a criterion for demarcating scientific propositions
from hypotheses. Some version of this reading may be found in several
commentators, including Whewell (1971, p. 194), Burtt (1954, p. 219), Koyre´
(1965, p. 267ff), Torreti (1999, p. 73), De Pierris (2012) and Ducheyne (2012,
p. 117).
2. Rule III is a form of transductive reasoning.
According to this reading, Rule III argues that there is an inference from the
observable qualities to the qualities of their ultimate, atomic parts. The
atomic parts are not accessible to the senses as they are too small to leave
traces on our senses. Thus a transductive argument follows a more radical
inferential transition than induction, in that it is an inference from qualities
of observable bodies to bodies that are in principle unobservable. This
reading is difficult to make sense of whenever we consider the formal wording
of Rule III, but the history of Rule III, the historical context of Newton’s
atomism, and Newton’s explication of Rule III make this reading plausible.
We find the assimilation of Rule III to transdusction in Mandelbaum (1966,
pp. 84) and McGuire (1967, 1968, 1970).
3. Rule III uses invariance as a criterion of universality.
According to this reading, Rule III bases the universalization of qualities on
qualities of bodies cannot be intended or remitted, i.e., invariant qualities.
According to this reading, one should consider the parameter characterizing
the quality. If we know from experience that the body carries the same
parameter, no matter which forces operate on it or what experimental
context we measure this parameter, this parameter represents a universal
quality. We might consider the distinction between rest mass m0 and
relativistic mass mr = γm0 as a relevant analogy for understanding Newton’s
criterion. While rest mass is invariant in all inertial reference frames,
relativistic mass is variant.4 Thus we are comfortable assigning rest mass to
bodies themselves. Similarly, Newton is alluding to the invariant nature of
the Newtonian mass parameter, and thus thinks of it as an inherent quality
that describes the nature of bodies.
This reading of Rule III can be found in Finocchiaro (1974), McMullin (1978,
p. 142), Okruhlik (1989), Hooker (1991), Harper (2012, p. 38) and Janiak
(2010, p. 95). The reading renders Newton’s Rule III continuous with
modern mathematical ideas about representing physical attributes, and with
leading interpretations of the theory of relativity.
It is not entirely clear whether the various readings are necessarily exclusive.
4See Lange (2002, p. 224) for a view that connects the invariance of a parameter with
its status as an objective property that is “real”.
Perhaps Newton meant to combine more than one criterion to form Rule III. But a
few commentators have argued that reading Rule III as articulating a transductive
form of reasoning cannot cohere with the intension/remission criterion. For
example, McGuire has suggested that in addition to the inference to the qualities
of the atomic parts, Rule III relies on the intension/remission criterion for
highlighting the nature of these qualities as primary and essential. For McGuire
the purpose of the intension/remission criterion is to demonstrate that these
qualities are necessarily in the atomic parts of matter. But Okruhlik (1989)
criticizes McGuire’s reading since Newton argues that gravity is not an essential
quality, given that the weight of a body depends on the distance to the central
gravitating body. Thus, according to Okruhlik, since gravity cannot be inherent or
essential, it also cannot be a primary quality. In Okruhlik’s view, Newton was not
being very coherent in his methodological remarks. Janiak (2010, p. 93-95)
similarly argues that Newton could not have taken gravity to be essential, given
the variance of its intensity, and so it cannot be a primary quality. Janiak
consequently argues that the intention of Rule III cannot be to articulate a
criterion for identifying the primary qualities of the atomic parts. Instead Janiak
claims we should think of Rule III as incorporating two distinct criteria, one
empirical (Baconian induction), and one conceptual (intension/remission). The
conceptual criterion applies only to the standard list of primary qualities; the
empirical criterion applies to gravity as well.
In this paper I argue that there is no genuine conflict between the three
readings, as long as we properly understand what Newton meant by his
intension/remission criterion. According to the reading offered here, the
transductive inference is in fact grounded by the intension/remission criterion.
Given that the qualities were observed in all bodies, and given that the qualities
cannot be intended or remitted, Newton argues that one may conclude that they
are present in the atomic parts of matter, and should be deemed as primary and
universal qualities. However, in order to see how the intension/remission criterion
grounds the transductive inference, we need to revise our understanding of this
criterion, and the nature of invariance that Newton has in mind.
According to the account developed here, Newton is committed to thinking
about material bodies as composed of indivisible atoms. While atomism, or the
corpuscular thesis, is traditionally associated with a predetermined list of primary
qualities (namely, size, shape and motion), at Newton’s hand the atomist thesis
becomes a methodological requirement for scientific explanations. Instead of basing
the atomist thesis on a predetermined list of primary qualities, in Newton’s
thinking this list is open-ended, allowing experience to determine which qualities
are attributed to the atomic parts. I shall term this Newtonian way of thinking
“methodological atomism”, to differentiate it from standard atomist theories. Thus
my reading of Rule III follows the traditional reading of Mandelbaum and
McGuire, and its purpose is to defend this reading, namely, that Newton is
thinking of Rule III as an inference from observed qualities to primary qualities of
the atomic parts. However, the reading of Rule III as a criterion for distinguishing
primary from secondary qualities requires a revision in our understanding of the
intension/remission criterion. I argue that this criterion is not meant to articulate
a general mathematical criterion of invariance as a mark of universality, but that
Newton is thinking of a very specific form of invariance; namely, invariance under
reconfiguration of the atomic parts. That is, the intension/remission criterion
highlights a specific form of invariance that is the counterpart of Newton’s
methodological atomism. Given that matter is made of atomic parts which are all
alike, the qualities that directly arise from the primary qualities would not change
their intensity whenever the configuration of the parts changes, or the spatial
arrangement of the atomic parts realigns. On the other hand, secondary qualities
are those that vary as a result of the reconfiguration of the parts. Given this
reading of the intension/remission criterion, one would be able to accept the
gravitational quality as both primary and non-essential. Indeed, I shall argue that
this is the main conceptual innovation that enables Newton to broaden the
boundaries of the mechanistic paradigm.
In section 2 I reconstruct and provide some textual evidence for the
transductive reading of Rule III. In Section 3 I consider some reasons to doubt the
existing readings of Rule III. In section 4 I argue that we ought to revise our
understanding of the intension/remission criterion of Rule III, and take it as
invariance under changes of configuration of the atomic parts. In section 5 I
consider how the reading offered here coheres with the list of qualities deemed as
universal by Newton. I conclude in section 6.
2 Some evidence in support of the
transductive reading
Before examining the coherence of the various readings of Rule III, we investigate
what textual evidence can be given in support of the transductive reading; since
the other readings flow more naturally from the wording of Rule III.
After articulating Rule III, Newton adds the following explication:
For the qualities of bodies can be known only though experiments; and
therefore qualities that square with experiments universally are to be
regarded as universal qualities; and qualities that cannot be diminished
cannot be taken away from bodies. Certainly idle fancies ought not to
be fabricated recklessly against the evidence of the experiments, nor
should we depart from the analogy of nature, since nature is always
simple and ever consonant with itself. The extension of bodies is known
to us only through our senses, and yet there are bodies beyond the
range of these senses; but because extension is found in all sensible
bodies, it is ascribed to all bodies universally. We know by experience
that some bodies are hard. Moreover, because the hardness of the whole
arises from the hardness of its parts, we justly infer from this not only
the hardness of the undivided particles of bodies that are accessible to
our senses, but also of all other bodies. That all bodies are impenetrable
we gather not by reason but by our senses. We find those bodies that
we handle to be impenetrable, and hence we conclude that
impenetrability is a property of all bodies universally. That all bodies
are movable and persevere in motion or in rest by means of certain
forces (which we call forces of inertia we infer from finding these
properties in the bodies that we have seen. The extension, hardness,
impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of the whole arise from the
extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of
each of the parts; and thus we conclude that every one of the least parts
of all bodies is extended, hard, impenetrable, movable, and endowed
with a force of inertia. And this is the foundation of all natural
philosophy. (Newton, 1999, p. 795-796)
The explication of Rule III suggests that there remains in Rule III a connection to
Newton’s atomistic thesis, since Newton asserts that the Rule allows him to infer
the qualities of the ultimate parts of matter from the observable composite bodies.
He argues that we universally find certain qualities to exist in observable
macroscopic bodies and that we are “not to recede from the analogy of Nature,
which uses to be simple, and always consonant to itself”. The analogy of nature is
an analogy between various scales of nature, the very large, the medium sized and
the microscopic. The reference to analogy of nature suggests that while the atomic
parts are inaccessible to our senses, it is reasonable to conclude that they conform
to the analogy of nature. The laws of Euclidean geometry are isotropic, thus they
are the same laws existing at all observable scales of nature. We apply Euclid’s
laws at astronomical scales, at the scale of extremely large objects, and at the scale
of small objects that we can touch with our hands and see with our eyes. It would
therefore be natural to extend the analogy of nature from the observable realm to
the microscopic components from which all matter is made. That is, it is
reasonable to assume, given that the analogy of nature holds for extension at all
observable scales, that it will also hold for the atomic parts. Newton goes on to
suggest that the analogy of nature holds for extension, impenetrability, hardness,
mobility, force of inertia, and eventually gravity. However, such an analogy of
nature does not hold for other qualities, such as color, taste, and perhaps also
elasticity and magnetism. Thus we may conclude that extension, hardness,
impenetrability, mobility and force of inertia are qualities that describe the least
atomic parts, i.e., the smallest scale at which these qualities exist, while other
qualities do not.
The nature of the inference is fully brought out the when Newton describes the
inference regarding the quality of hardness: “because the hardness of the whole
arises from the hardness of its parts, we justly infer from this not only the hardness
of the undivided particles of bodies that are accessible to our senses, but also of all
other bodies.” There is first the claim that the hardness of composite bodies is
reduced to the hardness that characterizes their atomic parts. We therefore
conclude that all parts of observable matter are hard. The further inference is that
such a quality is a primary quality, that is a quality that characterizes atoms in
general. And so, we conclude that all material bodies are made of the same kind of
atoms that are hard, that is, all material bodies are themselves hard.
Newton makes clear in his explication that the inference from bodies to their
ultimate parts governs all known primary qualities: “The extension, hardness,
impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of the whole arise from the extension,
hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of each of the parts; and
thus we conclude that every one of the least parts of all bodies is extended, hard,
impenetrable, movable, and endowed with a force of inertia. And this is the
foundation of all natural philosophy.” Newton argues that he has identified the
central inference from qualities of observed bodies to qualities of the atomic parts,
and that this inference grounds the entire enterprise of natural philosophy.
Further support for the transductive reading can be found in Cotes’s Preface to
the Principia. Cotes was the editor of the second edition, and he took upon
himself to summarize the overall structure of Newton’s argument, so that we might
have an overall view of Newton’s main scientific achievement. After rehearsing the
central features of the argument, Cotes compares the inference regarding the
nature of gravity to other inferences we might have about qualities that are
traditionally seen as primary:
Now, since all terrestrial and celestial bodies on which we can make
experiments or observations are heavy, it must be acknowledged without
exception that gravity belongs to all bodies universally. And just as we
must not conceive of bodies that are not extended, mobile, and
impenetrable, so we should not conceive of any that are not heavy. The
extension, mobility, and impenetrability of bodies are known only
through experiments; it is in exactly the same way that the gravity of
bodies is known. . . . If anyone were to say that the bodies of the fixed
stars are not heavy, since their gravity has not yet been observed, then
by the same argument one would be able to say that they are neither
extended nor mobile nor impenetrable, since those properties of the
fixed stars have not yet been observed. Need I go on? Among the
primary qualities of all bodies universally, either gravity will have a
place, or extension, mobility, and impenetrability will not. And the
nature of things either will be correctly explained by the gravity of
bodies or will not be correctly explained by the extension, mobility, and
impenetrability of bodies. (Newton, 1999, p. 392-393)
According to Cotes, the evidence Newton points out shows that gravity is a
primary quality like any other primary quality, a quality that characterizes all
atomic parts. The choice, according to Cotes, is either to accept gravity as a
primary quality like other known primary qualities, or deny the status of primary
qualities to all the qualities that are deemed primary in the mechanistic tradition.
The atomistic background to Rule III is also evident from the prehistory of the
Rule. Some intriguing revisions occur between the first and second editions of the
Principia. The revisions came in response to severe criticisms that were leveled
against the non-mechanical nature of Newton’s theory of gravity. In the first
edition (1687), Newton included the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis III Every body can be transformed into a body of any
other kind and successively take on the intermediate degrees of qualities.
(Newton, 1999, Cohn’s Introduction, p. 202)
Newton here appears to be committed to an atomistic conception, according to
which all parts of matter are of the same kind. According to this view, the
difference between kinds of body is the mere result of a body’s transformation. For
example it should be possible to take a body made of wood, and reconfigure the
parts of the body, i.e., transform it, so as to produce a body that is made of iron.
Given that all parts of matter are the same, it is only the distinct configuration of
the parts that determines their particular kind. Newton does not seem to place
significance on the shapes or contingent properties of the atoms in explaining how
qualities of composite bodies are determined, but he seems to argue that no quality
(other than the ones to be found in the atomic parts) is inseparable from the body.
Any such quality can be made to diminish its amplitude or degree, and assume
successively the quality’s intermediate degrees. It is also possible to diminish the
quality’s intensity until it is no longer present in the body. For example, assume
that we have a body with the color white. Given the atomistic thesis, the quality
of being white belongs to the composite body, and does not stem solely from the
qualities present in the atomic parts. When we manipulate the configuration of the
parts, e.g. take the body and melt it, or pound it to reduce it to powder, we may
introduce via the transformation of the body various manifestations of the color
white, in this way diminishing or increasing its intensity. Furthermore, it may be
possible to slowly transform the body until it no longer has the quality of being
white, i.e., it is transparent. The suggestions is that while bodies appear to have
various sensible qualities, such as the color of wood, the smoothness of metals, the
acidity of lemon juice, these qualities are partly the result of the contingent
configuration of the parts, and can be separated from bodies (or reintroduced) as a
result of a process of reconfiguration.
The transductive reading of Rule III becomes plausible when we place Rule III
in its proper historical and textual context. Given that Hypothesis III commits
Newton to the atomist thesis, and given that Rule III is intended to provide the
same methodological justification as Hypothesis III, it seems plausible to think
that the purpose of Rule III is to articulate an inference from the observable
qualities to the primary qualities of the atomic parts. In this way, demonstrating
which qualities ought to be considered universal qualities.
3 Problems with traditional readings of Rule
III
In the next section I shall argue that given the transductive reading of Rule III, a
correct analysis of the intension/remission criterion should alter our understanding
of the type of invariance Newton has in mind. Before articulating the argument in
favor of reinterpreting Newton’s intension/remission criterion, it serves us to
consider the tensions that each reading of Rule III raises. The most important
criteria for evaluating the various readings of Rule III are textual fidelity, historical
plausibility, and conceptual coherence. It is important that the reading of Rule III
will cohere with Newton’s wording of Rule III and its explication. Furthermore, a
plausible reading of Rule III will explain how Newton thought it was legitimate to
replace Hypothesis III, which includes a commitment to the thesis of
transmutation, with Rule III, which combines the intension/remission criterion
together with proper empirical grounding. It is evident, from the specific ways in
which Hypothesis III and Rule III are used in Newton’s argument, that they serve
the exact same methodological role. Thus, a reading that is faithful to Newton’s
text would explain the continuity between Hypothesis III and Rule III. Such a
reading would also cohere with the entire explication offered for Rule III in the
second and third editions of the Principia. The criterion of conceptual coherence
requires that the reading explains how Rule III applies to the specific list of
universal qualities Newton mentions. In particular, this should be demonstrated
for the quality of gravity, since Rule III was specifically designed to show that
gravity ought to be taken as a universal quality.
The main problem with assimilating Rule III to simple Baconian induction is
that it largely ignores the intension/remission criterion. This reading therefore has
a serious problem with being faithful to the text. More seriously, this reading is
unable to account for the continuity between Hypothesis III and Rule III, because
it is unable to show why a largely metaphysical statement is equivalent in
Newton’s eyes to a rule emphasizing an inductive procedure. Such a reading makes
Newton a poor philosopher or an opportunistic thinker. While it is legitimate to
accuse Newton of being an imperfect philosopher, one does need to consider the
exactness with which almost all other propositions in the Principia are articulated,
and the care which Newton had taken in forming various drafts for Rule III, before
inserting the final draft into the second edition of the Principia, some 28 years
after the first edition was published.
The benefit of assimilating Rule III to a transductive inference is that it is much
more faithful to Newton’s text and Newton’s historical context. The doctrine of
transmutability is essentially a commitment to methodological atomism, and so it
is reasonable to read Rule III as differentiating the qualities which are primary, i.e.,
those qualities that characterize all atomic parts, from secondary qualities which
arise from the primary qualities and the configuration of those parts. However,
there is a problem with the conceptual coherence of this reading, at least according
to some common criteria for distinguishing between primary and secondary
qualities. It is ordinarily understood during the 17th century that primary
qualities are essential and inherent to bodies, as they provide the conceptual
bedrock for the independent existence of atoms. If we take McGuire’s suggestion,
that the intension/remission criterion provides a criterion for the essential nature
of primary qualities, an immediate tension is formed with Newton’s assertion that
gravity is not essential. If the intension/remission criterion is not a criterion for the
essential nature of primary qualities, then it is not clear what distinguishes the
transductive reading from the inductive reading. In what sense is an inference to
the primary qualities of the ultimate parts of matter anything more than an
inductive inference from observed bodies to all bodies in nature?
The main benefit of taking Rule III as articulating a connection between the
invariant nature of a quality and its universality, is that it brings to bear Newton’s
skillful use of mathematical methods for analyzing physical quantities. It is the
invariant nature of mass, for example, in various physical and chemical processes,
and in mathematical representations of such processes, that makes this quality a
very good candidate for a universal quality that exists in all bodies. This reading’s
drawback is that it is difficult to make it cohere with the list of qualities that are
mentioned in Rule III. For example, how is force of inertia shown to be a universal
quality, given that the force of inertia can be intended or remitted? Given that the
force of inertia depends on the body’s velocity, it clearly is not an invariant quality
of the body, and it would be strange if one could think of it as essential in any way
or primary.5 More importantly, how can Newton think that invariance is a mark of
the universal nature gravity, given that its intensity is not invariant? In response
to this worry one often finds the claim that gravity is always proportional to the
body’s mass, and so is a function of an invariant parameter. If a force law depends
on invariant parameters of bodies, so the argument goes, the force is a universal
force. But this is a strange reading of the wording of Rule III, because Newton has
never said that the mass parameter causes both the force of inertia and the force of
5See Finocchiaro (1974, p. 68) for raising this issue with the force of inertia.
gravity, and that since an invariant quality causes the force of inertia and the
gravitational force, that the latter are deemed universal. The language that treats
the mass parameter as some cause is entirely absent from Newton’s explication of
Rule III.
Another problem with the invariance reading of Rule III is that it seems
unfaithful to Newton’s text, since it is not clear at all how the intension/remission
criterion is related to Hypothesis III and the doctrine of transmutation. In
Hypothesis III, Newton argues that all qualities of bodies can be intended and
remitted, and a body of any kind can be transformed into a body of any other
kind. How does Newton move from the doctrine of transmutation and the varying
intensities of qualities to mathematical invariance as a mark of universality?
It is clear that each of the available readings of Rule III have serious drawbacks
of either being unfaithful to Newton’s text, lacking historical plausibility, or lacking
coherence. The suggestion in what follows is that one needs to combine elements of
these various readings into one coherent reading, that will remove the drawbacks of
each specific reading.
4 The nature of invariance in Newton’s
intension/remission criterion, and the
character of Newtonian inductivism
The various drafts Newton has written down in preparation of the second edition
of the Principia (1713) suggest that Hypothesis III is an earlier version of Rule III
which appears in the second edition. While Hypothesis III and Rule III are very
different in formulation, it is clear from the drafts that Newton had erased the
word “Hypothesis” where Hypothesis III was written, and introduced the word
“Rule” (McGuire, 1967, p. 235). He also articulated various versions of this Rule,
ending with the final version inserted into the second edition. That they are
intended as different expressions of the same idea is made clear by the fact that
Rule III is cited at the same place within Book III, Proposition VII, Corollary II of
the Principia, where previously Hypothesis III was cited.6
A comparison between Hypothesis III and Rule III suggests that a quality that
cannot be intended or remitted is what Boyle and Locke have referred to as a
primary qualities, while those that are intended and remitted are secondary
qualities. Thus, Hypothesis III refers to secondary qualities, which can assume
various degrees when a body undergoes transformation. Rule III, on the other
hand, refers to primary qualities which do not assume various degrees when a body
is transformed.
The atomist thesis is therefore implicitly committed to the existence of two
kinds of qualities. Those qualities that are present in the atomic parts, and cannot
be separated from them (i.e., primary qualities), and qualities that are attributed
to composite bodies, that are nevertheless separable from them (i.e., secondary
qualities). Since he asserts that every body can be transformed to a body of any
other kind, Newton is committed to the notion that the real difference between
bodies of distinct kinds amounts to differences of configuration, i.e., differences in
how the atomic parts are put together. Boyle’s technical term for the notion of
configuration is “texture.” According to Boyle the texture of a body includes the
6Further evidence that he viewed Rule III as a reformulation of Hypothesis III is a
draft of Corollary II written after the first edition where Newton argued that the fact
that gravity is a quality that cannot be remitted is a property of all bodies, according to
Hypothesis III. See McGuire (1967, p. 234).
order and posture of the different corpuscles, i.e., order consists of the relative
positions between the parts and posture includes the spatial orientation of each of
the parts. Thus for Newton whenever we find a quality of a composite body, which
has an intensity that varies as a result of changing the body’s texture, the quality
can assume every degree of its intensity, until a body is transformed into a different
kind of body. Thus in Hypothesis III Newton commits himself to the claim that
qualities variant under changes of texture are secondary qualities, and are
separable from bodies.
We are not using the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in
Descartes’ or Locke’s sense, who claim that ideas of primary qualities resemble
those qualities while ideas of secondary qualities do not. In the context of Rule III,
the distinction amounts to that between fundamental and derived; the primary
qualities are those that form the basis of a scientific theory (and are present in all
the atomic parts) and secondary qualities are those are derived from the
fundamental qualities of the parts, together with the body’s texture.7
The continuity between Hypothesis III and Rule III can also be seen in one of
the drafts of Rule III, added as an Axiom 4 to one of Newton’s revisions of the first
edition:
Qualities which are intended (and remitted such as motion and rest,)
heat and cold, wet and dry, light and darkness, . . . , these things do not
come in for consideration here. The things which cannot be intended
and remitted such as (bulk) impenetrability (solidity) and motion
7Notice that this atomist view is consistent with Newton’s agnosticism about whether
atoms are divisible or not. While the ultimate parts of matter might be divisible, the
point is that however finely the parts are divided, they will carry the universal qualities
at stake. See Janiak (2010, p. 109).
. . . and that inertia which causes a resistance to motion and to changes
of motion (solidity and extension) are usually considered to be the
properties of all bodies. And the reason is because a quality which
cannot be remitted cannot be taken away (from the whole); and on the
other hand that which can be taken away, if it were to be taken away
from some parts of the whole, it could be remitted in the whole.
Impenetrability indeed is usually described as the essence of bodies and
is hence attributed to all of them; but the essential properties of bodies
do not become known by the light of nature. We gather (only) from the
senses the fact that the bodies we touch (all tangible things) are
impenetrable and we (conclude that) we attribute to all bodies alike, no
less to the heavenly bodies and to bodies imperceptible to the senses
than to those bodies which we touch: and that too with an argument
which we think so strong (that nothing in the whole nature of things)
that this quality is taken to be the essence of bodies and is therefore
considered to be the firmest foundation of all philosophy. Therefore the
axiom on the strength of which we gather this property of bodies must
not be repudiated. Of the same kind is the argument for inertia and
(mobility and force of resistance) of matter. (McGuire, 1967, p. 237)
It is clear from this draft that Newton is distinguishing a long list of qualities that
can be intended and remitted from qualities that cannot. But the important thing
to notice is that Newton connects invariance with a part-whole relation. He says
that a quality that cannot be remitted cannot be taken away from the whole. By
which he seems to mean that that given a composite entity, and that various
attempts to transform this entity (say, by manipulations of force) are unable to
increase or diminish the quality’s intensity, implies that it is inseparable from the
whole. The implication of this invariance is that a quality that is invariant in the
whole is the direct sum of the qualities that are present in the parts, and so it
cannot be diminished when the whole is transformed or when the body’s texture is
manipulated. Similarly, Newton says that if the quality were separable from the
parts, it would be diminished in the whole. Thus, the notion of inseparability from
the parts is shown to be intimately tied to the invariance of a quality in the whole.
One should also notice from this quote the distinction Newton draws between
finding the essential qualities of the atomic parts and the epistemic role of the
intension/remission criterion. Newton argues that “the essential properties of
bodies do not become known by the light of nature”. That is, unlike Descartes and
other speculative philosophers, who inquire after the essence of bodies via some
conceptual criterion, the purpose of this criterion is determine the basic qualities of
the atomic parts via experience. Because the intension/remission criterion is based
on our experience with transformations of texture, the list of primary qualities
might grow in tandem with our understanding of the phenomena. Newton is
therefore articulating an empiricist criterion for primary qualities.
It is neither Descartes’s nor Boyle’s expectation that gravity should be
anything but a secondary quality, one that is explained by other primary qualities
and various configurations, motions and frictions of bodies that move through the
ether pervading all of space. But Newton’s main scientific discovery, and perhaps
his unparalleled achievement, is to uncover the fact that gravity does not behave
like a secondary quality whose intensity changes whenever the texture of a body
changes. For example, we know that gravitational acceleration is the same for all
bodies on the surface of the earth, regardless of their varying textures. We can also
appreciate why the mention of essential qualities was dropped in the final
formulation of Rule III. While Rule III demonstrates that gravity is a primary
quality, one cannot think of gravity as an essential or inherent quality, given that a
body’s weight is dependent on the distance to other massive bodies.
The type of invariance described in Rule III is distinct from the kind of
invariance involved in finding the same parameter under all changes in relations to
other bodies. The invariance of quality Newton is concerned with is invariance
under the active reconfiguration of the body’s parts. Such invariance does not
necessarily presuppose that the quality at stake is inherent, since it may be that a
quality that is invariant under changes of texture is still a relative or a
non-inherent quality (i.e., determined by a set of relations to parts that are not
part of the body). If the quality does not increase or diminish its intensity while
changing the configuration of the parts, all this means is that the quality is
reducible to the qualities present in the parts, and is not a function of the specific
configuration of the parts. Thus the reading we provide here is distinct from the
standard reading which assimilates Rule III to a general invariance criterion.
We might summarize Newton’s inference as follows:
All observed bodies have a quality Q.
The quantity describing the intensity of Q is invariant under
transformations of texture (i.e., reconfiguration of the parts).
Therefore, all bodies have a quality Q.
The inference described by Rule III is therefore a particular kind of inductive
inference. It is an inference that requires a wider basis than most inductive
procedures, because it relies on a quality that is found in all observed bodies. But
the inference is not a simple inductive inference, as it incorporates two distinct
steps. From the fact that all observed bodies have quality Q, and that the quantity
describing the intensity of Q is invariant under transformations of texture, Newton
concludes that all ultimate parts of observed matter have quality Q. Let us call
this type of inference the “transductive” inference from the observed composites to
their unobserved, ultimate parts. The second inductive step derives from the fact
that all ultimate parts of observed matter have quality Q the claim that all parts of
matter have quality Q. Let us call this step “universal induction”. From the fact
that all parts of matter have quality Q, Newton concludes that all bodies have
quality Q, assuming here that a primary quality Q of any composite body is a
direct sum of the qualities present in the parts.
Thus we see that a proper reading combines all standard readings into one
coherent reading, where induction, transduction, and invariance all have a specific
role to play. But to do so we must revise the traditional way in which
commentators have understood Newton’s intension/remission criterion, and think
of it as invariance under changes of texture.
5 Newton’s list of primary qualities
It remains to be seen how the reading we provide is consistent with Newton’s list
of universal qualities, namely, extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, force
of inertia, and gravity. In what sense can we say that each of these qualities has a
quantity invariant under transformations of texture?
When considering the quality under consideration, and the claim that the
quality’s intensity cannot be intended or remitted, we need to consider the
quantities that represent those qualities. In the case of extension, we may think of
the geometric quantity of volume, which represents the volume or space a body
takes up. It is clear that while a body may increase or decrease in volume, as for
example, in the case of a gas that expands or contracts, such changes in volume are
ordinarily the result of a body’s density decreasing or increasing, or the body’s
empty regions and pores increasing or diminishing. But the body itself, pores
excluded, has a volume that is a mathematical sum of the volumes of the parts.
One may consider this additive nature of volume as perhaps the defining
characteristic of Euclidean Geometry. A central presupposition for Euclidean
Geometry is the notion that when segments of lines are added, the magnitude
attributed to the composite line is a sum of the magnitudes attributed to the parts.
A similar assumption holds for the entire volume attributed to a composite body as
a function of the volumes attributed to the parts. Thus, it seems to be an essential
assumption in Euclidean Geometry that the volume of a body will not change as a
result of the reconfiguration of the parts, as long as we do not include pores and
empty regions in the volume’s calculation. This implies that the extension we
attribute to composite bodies is analogous to the extensions attributed to the
body’s ultimate parts, and that extension is therefore a universal quality.
Hardness and impenetrability seem to be associated with a body, and make the
body distinct from space itself. Notice that Newton is not mentioning mass, or
Quantity of Matter, as the universalized quality, because for him the mass
parameter is merely a quantity, not the qualitative aspect of bodies that make
them impenetrable or hard, i.e., the qualitative aspects that make them material
bodies. This point perhaps ought to be emphasized, because commentators often
ignore the actual list of qualities mentioned by Newton, which include hardness
and impenetrability and simply indicate mass as a universal quality, itself not
listed by Newton as a universal quality. The difference between a quantity and a
quality is that a quantity may indicate a measure attributed to a quality, but it
does necessarily represent the quality itself, given that the quantity attributed to
the body depends also on the number of bodies present or the magnitude of a
composite body. Thus, the mass of a composite body does not indicate solely the
inherent quality of a body, but is oftentimes amassed from the measures
representing the inherent qualities present in the body’s ultimate parts. If we
divide a composite body into two, it is often the case that nothing inherently
changes in that composite body, we simply separate out one part of the aggregate
from another. However, the mass, or quantity of matter of the composite body will
be divided into two distinct quantities of matter. Thus, it is a misreading of
Newton’s words when commentators take the mass parameter itself to be a quality,
as the mass parameter is nothing but a measure, a magnitude representing a
certain intensity associated with a quality, or a measure associated with an
aggregate of bodies that have the quality.
The claim that hardness and impenetrability are universal qualities is implied
by the fact that mass parameter is invariant under transformations of texture. We
can conclude from this feature of the mass parameter that impenetrability and
hardness are universal qualities. Given that the Quantity that represents the
measure of bodies behaves like an extensive quantity, analogous to temporal
duration and extension, it is divisible into the ultimate parts of matter.
Mobility is the power of bodies to move from one place to another, and force of
inertia compels a body to move in a straight line. Both of these qualities are
reflected in the Quantity associated with moveable bodies, i.e., the quantity of
motion (Newton’s term for momentum). The quantity of motion of a composite
body is always the sum of the quantities of motion attributed to the parts. Thus,
there is strong indication that changes in the configuration of the parts do not
correlate with changes in the overall quantity of motion (assuming a particular
distribution of quantities of motion in the parts). The divisible nature of quantity
of motion is also implied by the fact that the quantity of motion of a solid body is
proportional to the quantity of matter. This implies that each part of the solid
body carries its own quantity of motion, that is, each part of the body has both
mobility and force of inertia.
The fact that quantity of motion is proportional to quantity of matter, renders
mobility and force of inertia universal qualities. But this is not because mass is an
inherent parameter, and it causes the force of inertia. Rather, the fact that
quantity of motion is proportional to the mass parameter is mathematical evidence
that quantity of motion is a divisible Quantity, and that it arises from the
quantities of motion attributed to the ultimate parts of matter, and not from the
particular configuration of the parts. This is a subtle point, because the traditional
invariance view is unable to make sense of the force of inertia being a universal
quantity. The force of inertia can be intended or remitted as the result of changes
in the body’s velocity.8 If one views the quantity of motion as a simply a vector
quantity attributed to a particle, equal to the product of mass and velocity, then
one will not be able to understand how the invariance criterion applies to force of
inertia. But consider Newton’s explication of his definition of quantity of motion:
The motion of the whole is the sum of the motions of the individual
parts, and thus if a body is twice as large as another and has equal
velocity, there is twice as much motion, and if it has twice the velocity
8To make sense of how the force of inertia is explained by Rule III, Janiak (2010, p. 95)
argues that the force of inertia is simply mass, given that Definition III of the Principia
associates the force of inertia with a body’s mass. But this is simply a confused reading of
Definition III, where Newton asserts that the force of inertia is proportional to the body,
and is the inertia of the body. The force of inertia is also determined by the body’s velocity,
since it can be considered as the body’s impetus. Moreover, identifying force of inertia
with mass is odd, since Newton lists four universal qualities, hardness, impenetrability,
mobility, and force of inertia – are all these qualities intended to simply represent mass?
It would be quite a redundant and perplexing list.
there si four times as much motion. (Newton, 1999, p. 404)
Newton does not clearly distinguish between the extension of the body and its
mass, but he clearly thinks that quantity of motion behaves partly like an
extensive quality, given that it is proportional to the “size” of the body. The
quantity of motion can be intended or remitted, but it cannot be intended or
remitted as a result of changes in texture, unless those changes in texture involve
causal interactions with external objects.
And finally we get to the quality of gravity. It is the purpose of Rule III, I
contend, to show that gravity is primary like any other primary quality. It is the
surprising conclusion derived from Newton’s work, and the main scientific
achievement and innovation of his philosophy of nature. Rule III, therefore has the
sole role of convincing Newton’s readers of the reducible, or divisible nature of
gravity, and therefore that such divisible nature implies its universality. His
explication of Rule III continues as follows:
Finally, if it is universally established by experiments and astronomical
observations that all bodies on or near the earth gravitate toward the
earth, and do so in proportion to the quantity of matter in each body,
and that the moon gravitates toward the earth in proportion to the
quantity of its matter, and that our sea in turn gravitates towards the
moon, and that all planets gravitate toward one another, and that there
is a similar gravity of comets toward the Sun, it will have to be
concluded by this third rule that all bodies gravitate toward one
another. Indeed, the argument from phenomena will be even stronger
for universal gravity than for the impenetrability of bodies, for which, of
course, we have not a single experiment, and not even an observation, in
the case of the heavenly bodies. Yet I am by no means affirming that
gravity is essential to bodies. By inherent force I mean only the force of
inertia. Gravity is diminished as bodies recede from the earth. (Newton,
1999, p. 796)
Notice that Newton highlights two properties of gravity; that gravity is present in
all observable bodies, and that it is proportional to quantity of matter. This,
according to him, suggests that criteria articulated by Rule III applies to gravity as
well. Under the traditional invariance reading of Rule III, this is a baffling claim.
It is one thing to claim that quantity of matter is universal, given that it is
invariant. But why do we think that a force proportional to quantity of matter is a
universal quality? Does this imply that any force law that includes an invariant
parameter is a universal law?
A more charitable reading connects the claim about gravitation being
proportional to quantity of matter to a claim about the divisible nature of the
gravitational force. Take for example the empirical fact that all bodies on the
surface of the earth experience the same gravitational acceleration. For Newton,
this empirical fact implies that the gravitational force is proportional to the
quantity of matter. Take a body with a certain mass of 1 Kg. It experiences a
gravitational acceleration of g = 9.8 [m]
[s]2
. If we divide the body into two parts, each
of which is 1/2 kg, each part experiences the exact same gravitational acceleration
as the composite whole. This implies that the gravitational force must be twice as
large in the composite body as the gravitational forces operating on the parts, to
produce the exact same gravitational acceleration. Divide the body further and
further into parts, since each of the divided part has the same gravitational
acceleration as the whole, one may conclude that the gravitational force is
proportional to the quantity of matter that is found in each of the parts, i.e., the
gravitational force is exactly divisible in proportion to the masses found in the
parts. If we divide a body further, until we reach the atomic parts, the force of
gravity will divide itself until we reach the force of gravity that operates on each
atomic part. The important fact about gravity, is that its intensity does not vary
as a result of reconfiguring the atomic parts, or changing the body’s texture. The
force of gravity of a composite body is a simple sum of the forces of gravity present
in each of the atomic parts. Thus, the fact that the force is proportional to
quantity of matter is essentially equivalent to the claim that a quantity
representing the quality cannot be intended or remitted as a result of reconfiguring
the body’s parts.
The invariance of gravity under changes of texture is in direct conflict with
mechanical theories of ether. When we imagine gravity to be a product of the
friction created by an ether, we must suppose that the configuration of a body, its
particular shape, whether its surface is smooth or coarse, would affect the intensity
of gravity. Newton’s Principia is also a study of the theory of fluids which
demonstrates how bodies of varying shapes and volume would move differently
through a fluid medium. Thus, Newton’s claim is that contrary to any
expectations produced by mechanical ether theories of gravity, gravity is a divisible
quantity, not produced by any pressure between the ether fluid and surface of
bodies. Such pressure would necessarily depend on the body’s texture and the
relative configuration of the parts.
This reading of Rule III enables us to view gravity as primary and non-essential
or non-inherent. It is primary, in the sense that it can be universalized to all
atomic parts. However, it is not essential, because the force of gravity that
operates on each part varies in its intensity as the parts recede from the central
gravitating body. Thus Newton’s innovation is in articulating a criterion for
distinguishing primary from secondary qualities, without this criterion necessarily
demonstrating the essential nature of the quality.
One difficulty with this view is that it seems to suggest that a world containing
a single atom might not have the gravitational quality. If the gravitational force is
necessarily derived from relations between bodies, it cannot be present in a single
atom, if that atom is the only one existing. Newton has two interpretive options to
deal with such a case. One option is to argue that Rule III shows gravity to be a
universal quality, except for the case of a universe containing a single atom, where
gravity does not exist. This option takes the universality of gravity to lack the
metaphysical grounds that make it a truly universal quality. Another interpretive
option would argue that the universality of gravity implies that a universe
containing a single atom is ruled out as physically impossible. Given that gravity is
universal, one may require that each atomic part would experience a gravitational
pull, so that any single atom requires at least one other atom to exit. Either of
these interpretive options seems counterintuitive, but the best way to
accommodate everything that Newton says, especially the claim that gravity is
both primary and non-essential, compels us to adopt one of these two options.
6 Conclusion
Recent scholarship regarding Newton’s inductive procedures has emphasized his
use of DI arguments, and have demonstrated the argumentative strategies that
distance Newton from the HD account. However, emphasizing the role of DI
arguments requires further analysis of the method by which a phenomenal law can
be elevated to a law of nature, without which the DI arguments do not have any
hinges on which to turn. Newtonian induction combines DI arguments, with a
distinct inductive procedure for unravelling primary, or universal qualities.
Newton’s methodological atomism is based on the idea that those qualities that are
derived from qualities of the atomic parts have an intensity that does not depend
on a body’s transformation of texture. Once we have reduced a quality to qualities
of the atomic parts, we can generalize to all atoms and to all composite bodies.
Laws that describe the nature of primary qualities are taken to be universal laws of
nature.
One might argue that methodological atomism is a hypothesis, and a false one
at that. Not all parts of matter are the same, and there are good reasons for
thinking that the analogy of nature fails. I cannot enter this important debate
given the limited scope of the paper, except to say that the universal nature of
extension, inertial forces, and gravity is still part of the foundation of contemporary
physics, despite the radically different theories that we have about these qualities.
So, perhaps in the physical sciences methodological atomism has its modern
variations. What was important to uncover in this paper was the distinct nature of
Newton’s inductive procedure, and how it differs from Baconian induction.
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